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INTRODUCTION This book is designed primarily for use by Sixth Form students taking modules in Irish history. I believe that it will also be of value to undergraduates as an introduction or primer to Ireland under the Union. In writing this book I have taken a chronological approach, however ideas and themes are also to be found within the narrative. The first chapter outlines the main events and themes before the 1790s and readers may skim over this initially. However, both the Introduction and Chapter 1 will need to be revisited with more care at a later stage. The last chapter is an overview of the Union and ties together some of the issues that are addressed in earlier chapters. Since the 1980s the teaching of history in British secondary schools has by-and-large neglected the study of the classic nineteenth century giants: Pitt, Liverpool, Palmerston, Peel, Gladstone, Disraeli, Salisbury and Chamberlain. To a degree Asquith and Lloyd George have been similarly ignored except as war leaders. I am therefore conscious that much of the British material is alien to many British students, many of whom have been fed on a diet of the twentieth century monsters, the Wild West or ‘Medicine from Plato to NATO’. Ironically it is more likely that British students will have looked at aspects of the “Irish problem” (because it was frequently in the news) much in the same way as they might have studied the Arab-Israeli conflict. British issues cannot be divorced from Irish affairs (nor from the great sweep of European and North American development). A comprehensive understanding of Irish affairs will enhance a student’s knowledge of British history in addition to covering a crucial period of Irish history in its own right. Primary sources and extracts are included; additionally explanatory sections on the Ulster Plantation, Fenianism, Obstructionism and the Orange Order are to be found in Chapters 1, 5, 6 and 9 respectively. These various boxed sections can be read independently of the main text. The most important names, events, laws and concepts have been denoted in bold type when first mentioned or else when they first have a major significance. I would suggest that students go out of their way to look up and appreciate the significance of these terms; teachers and lecturers may need to emphasise and dwell upon some of them. Students should also be prepared to utilise these (when relevant) in their essays and exams. A book that runs from the rebellion of the United Irishmen (1798) to Irish independence (1921) will naturally have the Union as its main theme. It would be too easy to see the period simply as one of the evolution of Irish nationalism. There are many other themes that are to be found in the years of the Union; most of which intertwine with nationalism. These are however valid themes in their own right. They enrich and cross-fertilise nineteenth and much of twentieth century Irish history. The most important of these are: The relationship between constitutional nationalism and insurrectionary republicanism which was never a simple polarity but more of a complex and ambiguous interaction within the spectrum of nationalism as a whole. The evolution of unionism that appeared to die in 1921, but in its Ulster form thwarted and stymied nationalism. The dynamics of the Irish economy that to a degree survived, evolved and in the case of eastern Ulster prospered. The complexities of the religious and land issues which are themes in their own right as well as being aspects of nationalism and unionism. The issue of emigration without which the social and political development of not only Ireland but also Britain and the English-speaking world (North America especially) would be very different. The social laboratory of Ireland in which numerous British governments abandoned laissez-faire policies and pursued state-sponsored solutions, some of which eventually filtered through to Great Britain. The use of political theatre, by which Irishmen were able to capitalise on the issue of the moment (generally a set-back) and make the most of the circumstances through successful publicity. By-and-large this was a nationalist phenomenon, but one of its most spectacular applications was the unionist gun running of 1914. Closely linked to political theatre is the issue of myth making. In politics what actually happened is often less important than what people have perceived to have happened. One of the themes of this book is the emergence of Ulster Unionism whose fortunes rose inversely to those of unionism as a whole. Within this phenomenon is the dynamic of the Ulster presbyterian tradition, without which Ulster protestant cohesion would not have become a viable political and social force. Amongst the most erudite and readily available books on Ireland within the period concerned is Roy Foster’s Modern Ireland 1600-1972. This is perhaps the most accessible for students, it has the advantage of covering a wider period than the years of the Union, a detailed chronology is included together with brief biographical portraits, some aspects of narrative are excluded however. George Boyce’s Nineteenth Century Ireland, The Search for Stability develops many themes of its own, as does Alvin Jackson’s Ireland 1798-1998. The latter however is perhaps outside the price range of students but is a useful tool for departmental and library use. More recently (paperback 2004) Jackson has published Home Rule, An Irish History 1800-2000. This excellent study of the home rule phenomenon does not cover other aspects of the Union and coverage of the first seventy years of the nineteenth century is necessarily light. Whilst unsuitable for many Sixth Formers this should be essential reading for undergraduates and the more capable A Level candidates especially as it is a comprehensive historiographical essay as well as covering Jackson’s own researches. FSL Lyons’ magisterial Ireland since the Famine though first published in 1971 has stood the test of time and is essential reading for anyone who considers himself a student of Irish history. Patrick Buckland’s booklet Irish Unionism (1973) is still the best introduction to Irish and Ulster Unionism. A more comprehensive bibliography is listed at the end. Most British history textbooks have sections or chapters devoted to “the Irish Problem”. In particular I would single out the old but stalwart Collins series “Britain in Modern Times”, most of which have a comprehensive chapter on Irish affairs. Additionally I have found the two Flagship histories of Britain that cover the nineteenth and twentieth centuries published by Harper Collins useful; these have excellent sections on Ireland and place Irish events and preoccupations in the context of British politics. For an overall view of British history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the relevant chapters of Kenneth Morgan’s Oxford Illustrated History of Britain give a comprehensive introduction to the topic. In the late nineteen thirties TW Moody and Owen Dudley Edwards modernised Irish historiography, putting it on a more rigorous and exacting footing. This was in part a response to the understandable subordination of much of Ireland’s historiography to the stresses and strains of the imperial and national struggles of previous years. They instituted a new approach through their own teaching and the journal that they founded: Irish Historical Studies. It was through this publication that the most cogent challenge to this revisionist approach was raised by Brendan Bradshaw (“Nationalism and historical scholarship in modern Ireland” in Irish Historical Studies xxvi, 104 November 1989) Bradshaw’s counter-revisionism claimed that the nationalist dimension had been underplayed – explained away by a clinical liberalism. There was a feeling that the Moody and Edwards school had pursued the evidence-based approach too rigidly. Revisionist scholarship has set and maintained standards and Irish historiography is now sufficiently mature in today’s post nation-building period. Irish historical study can now benefit from a variety of insights including that of a less Dublin-oriented approach; these include local studies and an appreciation of the Ulster perspective. For ease of reading and to ensure an uncluttered text I have largely dispensed with traditional references and footnotes. Occasional reference is made to the most seminal works in the text and some explanations are provided in a minimal number of footnotes. Statistical sources have been cited however. A capital letter has been used to denote a political party or movement (i.e. Liberal, Unionist or Nationalist), a lower case letter has been used when referring to a particular point of view or attitude (i.e. conservative, unionist or republican). 1. BEFORE 1798 The medieval period The formal relationship between England and Ireland began in the 1170s when Anglo-Norman barons became involved in warfare between warring Irish chiefs and kings. Throughout the history and prehistory of these islands (the term ‘British Isles’ is a sensitive one to many Irishmen) cross channel intercourse has been frequent and widespread. What was new in 1170 was the power of the English crown to intervene so as to curb the freelance ambitions of its barons. The English kings had the strength to assert and initially impose their authority. By the later middle ages however they had found that lordship was a relatively empty claim. The authority of the English kings as Lords of Ireland had been eclipsed by that of the native Gaelic Lords and the descendents of the twelfth century Anglo-Norman adventurers. The former had established dynastic links and alliances with the latter; an uneasy mutual understanding had developed often to the detriment of the English crown. The Tudors By the late fifteenth century formal English control had shrunk to the area around Dublin (the Pale) in which conditions approximated to that of the Anglo-Welsh or Anglo-Scottish marches. The situation was changed by Tudor assertiveness: in particular Henry VIII’s claim to kingship (as opposed to Lordship) and the contemporary English Reformation. Gradual and often hesitant attempts at colonisation (or plantation) and conquest occupied the rest of the sixteenth century. Only at the very end of Elizabeth’s reign (1603) was the conquest of Gaelic Ireland completed and actual royal authority extended to the whole island. The seventeenth century The seventeenth century revealed that much of the Elizabethan conquest and Jacobean plantation of Ulster had been insufficient to secure stability and had opened up many new areas of conflict that revolved around land and religion. Before Tudor times Anglo-Norman lords and Gaelic chiefs had coexisted in an uneasy mutual understanding. The influx of new settlers and protestantism destroyed the relative stability of the status quo. Few of those of Anglo-Norman descent (the Old English) took to the new protestant religion; both they and the Gaelic Lords found their loyalty to the English crown tested to breaking point as religion became the determining factor of political and legal identity. In the sixteenth century the Old English managed by-and-large to hang on to their allegiance to the Tudors. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries loyalty became increasingly defined by religion. The Gaelic Lords - and to an increasing extent the Old English population - opted to preserve their catholicism and land by identifying with the Counter Reformation and the catholic powers of Spain and France. (These kingdoms, like Scotland in the early fourteenth century or France and Germany in more modern times, utilised Ireland as another front in their international strategic struggles with England and then Britain). Reconquest at the end of the 1640s by Cromwell and again by William III at the beginning of the 1690s effectively deprived the Old English and Gaelic catholic magnates of any significant land ownership and therefore of political power and influence. Thus the old ruling elites who had been in rebellion against the protestant state lost control of their land. The new landowners were the protestant political masters and settlers of the late sixteenth and more especially the seventeenth centuries. Just as many of the old catholic elites had become imbued with the convictions of the Counter Reformation, the protestant settlers and new landowners subscribed to the certainties of the Reformation. These certainties and mutual incomprehensions had been reinforced by the brutality and myth-making potential of repeated rebellion and conquest, which exhibited some of the worst excesses of the contemporary European wars of religion. In the case of Ireland however two factors differentiated it from that of the rest of Europe. The new landed ruling class did not share the same religion as the majority of the population. Political and religious toleration was virtually unknown in early modern times; in nearly all areas of Europe religious minorities were deprived of civil and religious liberties, in the case of Ireland the catholic majority were subordinated to a political system that was not only imposed but was imposed by an alien Anglo-Scottish minority. With the advent of Enlightenment and French Revolutionary doctrines this was to create friction; this was to have an ever increasing significance as the nineteenth century heralded the involvement of the masses in political protest and eventually in the democratic process. The sixteenth and seventeenth century conquests were partly based on religious certainty but were also based on political insecurity. These two phenomena were well illustrated by the characteristics of Ulster presbyterianism. The protestantism of the seventeenth century Scottish settlers in Ulster was much more intense than that of their English (anglican) counterparts. It was based on a dynamism of personal conviction often accentuated by the trauma of persecution in their native Scotland and by an uncompromising frontier outlook when settled in Ulster. This calvinist siege mentality (together with a conscious work ethic) provided the dynamic of survival for the Ulster protestant community. The presbyterians underpinned the English settlers in Ulster creating a critical mass of protestants in the north of Ireland that was to have a lasting impact on the political demography of the whole island. The Plantation and Settlement of Ulster Until the beginning of the seventeenth century Ulster had been least affected by attempts at English rule and conquest. It remained physically isolated behind natural barriers of forest, river and mountain. Moreover the north and east coasts had gravitated towards western Scotland. An Ulster-Scottish axis was therefore a well-established phenomenon by 1603 marked by frequent cross channel population movements that involved both the Western Isles and the lowlands. The Elizabethan conquest was then confirmed and strengthened by James I and VI, the theme of ‘plantation’ or colonisation was continued on a greater and more successful scale than in the previous century. Sizeable Anglo-Scottish communities were planted in western and southern Ulster under royal licence to fill the vacuum left by the flight of the Ulster Gaelic earls (1607). Moreover as well as this official plantation much spontaneous Scottish lowland immigration had flowed into eastern Ulster exploiting the narrow gap of the North Channel used in previous centuries by the highland Gaelic speaking MacDonnells from the Isles. This demographic shift placed a fiercely independent presbyterian population in Ulster, that strengthened and stiffened the English (and therefore anglican) planters who had also been settled in Ulster. Despite tensions and differences of outlook the protestant Scottish and English settlers in Ulster began to develop a degree of cohesion that gave them a distinct identity when compared to the much more thinly spread English inhabitants in the rest of Ireland. By-and-large the Anglo-Scottish planters occupied the lower and more fertile land. They were required to build towns, fortify strongholds and furnish tenancies for farmers and artisans from England and Scotland. Although substantial numbers of all classes settled in Ulster, the full quota of immigrants was never achieved, the major “undertakers” were obliged to take on more native tenants than was originally envisaged. This, together with the upheaval of massacre and warfare in the 1640s, accounted for incomplete plantation in western and southern Ulster. Protestant settlement was far more complete and thorough in Antrim and Down, those counties planted by private enterprise and nearest to the southwest of Scotland. In the latter part of Charles II’s reign religious disruption in southern Scotland led to renewed migration to Ulster, thus reinforcing the Scottish covenanting and presbyterian tradition in Ulster (see Chapter 9). The eighteenth century The conquest of 1690/91 ushered in a century of anglican ascendancy; by-and-large the landowners belonged to the established anglican church which accounted for about half of the protestant population. As well as providing most of the land owning (and therefore the administrative, professional and legislative class) the Church of Ireland population contributed a varying number of shopkeepers and artisans in the towns of the south and west, mostly in Dublin and Cork. In Ulster the larger anglican population contributed to a far more homogenous and all-class group being represented in all walks of life. This and the concentration of presbyterian numbers gave the Ulster protestant population a solidity and confidence quite in excess of its numbers. Despite living alongside their presbyterian neighbours relations were not always harmonious between anglican and presbyterian; the presbyterians were treated as dissenters and found themselves denied the privileges monopolised by anglicans; the payment of tithe was a particular bone of contention. Presbyterians were conscious that they were the bedrock of protestant control of Ulster and were one of the most substantial elements underpinning protestant rule as a whole, they therefore resented their second class status. This was one of a number of factors that led to the radicalisation of the Ulster Presbyterians, many of whom resettled in North America in the hope of finding greater political and religious freedom as well as better economic prospects. Presbyterian radicalism also meant the French Revolution was greeted with enthusiasm in Belfast and some elements were inspired by the Society of United Irishmen, some found themselves in rebellion in 1798. Moreover, the “democratic” nature of the presbyterian church contrasted with the hierarchical nature of the episcopal anglican church. If the Ulster Scots found themselves as second-class citizens the Roman Catholic population were third class citizens – or rather subjects. A piecemeal battery of Penal Laws excluded them from public life and the exercise of their religion was inconvenient and at times difficult. When compounded with the decline of Gaelic society, a rapidly rising population that lacked the safety valve of a domestic agricultural and industrial revolution, major social and political tensions were bound to develop. To a degree some catholics developed commercial interests in the towns for much the same reasons as the presbyterians of Ulster had – exclusion from society, politics and local government. It is too simplistic, however, to compartmentalise anglicans as solely the rulers and landowners; presbyterians as the successful farmers and middleclass; and catholics as the poor and destitute. Landless Anglicans existed, as did poor presbyterian tenants and prosperous and influential catholics. For most of the Anglo-Irish ascendancy the eighteenth century was a golden age: they had wealth and had political power and influence through the Irish parliament at College Green or through the administration in Dublin Castle. They could wield political power in an eighteenth century sense or else benefit from the wheeler-dealing of parliamentary management and place-hunting. Their confidence and security was underpinned by their cross channel links with their cousins in the aristocracy and landowning classes of England. Their confidence is best instanced by the architectural magnificence of their palaces and mansions and by the classical orderliness of the Georgian town houses and terraces in Dublin and the lesser towns. This confidence was paralleled by a paradoxical “intense feeling of insecurity”. The post 1691 ascendancy suffered a degree of physical isolation: in the words of the twentieth century poet Richard Murphy “Landlords corresponded with landlords across bogs”; there was also an awareness of actual and potential political vulnerability. Their political, economic and social position was dependant on penal legislation against catholic and (to a lesser extent) against dissenter together with the fact that the 1691 settlement was underwritten by the British state. The fact that the confidence of the ascendancy was partly dependent on a cross channel “big brother” highlighted not only an insecurity but also a sense of resentment, best instanced by Jonathan Swift who riled against the corrupting influence of “English” control. The more intensely politically active tended to be both “protestant” in a hard-line sense but also “patriotic”. Normally this meant identification with the exclusive anglican political nation, but sometimes (as with Swift) a championing of all things Irish: “Burn everything English except their coal”. Despite what has just been said for much of the eighteenth century the Anglo-Irish ascendancy were prepared to trade their potential political power to the managers of the English Privy Council, or to the particular ministry’s Lord Lieutenant. In fact the Irish parliament was subordinate to the business managers of Whitehall to a greater extent even than the MPs at Westminster. The Irish administration and legislature normally did the bidding of London even if London was obliged to expend both energy and wealth to achieve its ends. With the American War of Independence the government in London was obliged to concede a greater degree of political power to the College Green parliament and between 1782 and 1798 “Grattan’s Parliament” appeared to have achieved a degree of real legislative independence. The Repeal of the “Sixth of George I” and the amending of Poyning’s Law meant that the Irish crown and parliament were defined as a law-giving authority in their own right who did not have to play second fiddle to Westminster. Moreover legislation could originate in Ireland. However the power of the monarch and of the London Privy Council still remained, as did the troubled relations between the Dublin Castle executive and the College Green Parliament. The Anglo-Irish ‘Patriots’ were conscious of their distinctive identity and whilst loyal to the crown were proud of their Irishness (and their protestantism). By-and-large this amounted to no more than a local patriotism that resented the assumption of superiority by the English. Though the efforts of the Irish political activists Flood and Grattan did produce changes including the relaxation of the Penal Laws, the late eighteenth century parliament failed to meet the expectations of the population as a whole, some of whom were becoming imbued with revolutionary and reformist expectations derived from the French Revolution. The relatively moderate and Enlightenment-oriented enthusiasms of the Society of United Irishmen had polarised by 1798 when a strange amalgam of idealistic and reformist patriotism became mixed up with real radicalism, revolutionary fervour and a catholic jacquerie. 2. REBELLION AND THE ACT OF UNION The economy Ireland’s population doubled between the mid-eighteenth century and the Act of Union, it was probably slightly less than 5 million by 1800. As the eighteenth century progressed there was an increasing dependence on the potato and the pig in those areas that lacked a varied economy. A dangerous reliance on the potato made the poorer western and south-western areas susceptible to Malthusian disaster (major famines had occurred in 1728-9 and 1740-1, the latter perhaps creating more death and destitution than the Great Famine of a hundred years later). By-and-large those areas of highest population density were the poorest and most dependent on the monoculture of the potato. Other areas developed a greater diversity of agriculture and in parts of eastern Leinster and in eastern Ulster there were industries largely though not exclusively based on linen. The protestant craftsmen of the towns and those in rural domestic linen production (Armagh, Antrim and Monaghan) increasingly found themselves clashing with upwardly mobile or land hungry catholics. In Armagh in particular this was to lead to the emergence of sectarian tensions and the foundation of the Orange Order in response to catholic incursion in 1795. Land hunger was a perennial eighteenth century and early nineteenth century problem throughout the island that led to faction fighting and secret rural societies (i.e. Whiteboys, Oakboys and Ribbonmen). This also involved the more sectarian Defenders (catholics) and the Orangemen previously mentioned. For various reasons Ireland did not benefit from an eighteenth century industrial revolution, though eastern parts of both Ulster (in particular) and Leinster were touched slightly by British industrial development. In the nineteenth century Belfast experienced an industrial revolution as large as any experienced in any of the northern English cities. Political tensions There were a variety of late eighteenth century hidden tensions that emerged in the 1780s and 1790s, some of an economic nature but others primarily political. As early as the 1720s large numbers of Presbyterians had left Ulster to seek religious freedom and to better their economic prospects. There was a population boom perhaps amounting to 20% in the last two decades of the century leading, amongst other issues, to increased sectarianism and land hunger. These were accentuated by economic fluctuations in Irish domestic industry. Furthermore the crisis of the American War of Independence had enabled protestant ‘patriots’ (loyal but independently minded) to wrest a degree of political power from London. Moreover amongst the American rebels were many first and second generation ‘Scotch-Irish’ whose actions were observed by their Ulster presbyterian cousins. A German mercenary fighting against the rebels wrote “Call it not an American Rebellion, it is nothing more nor less than an Irish-Scotch Presbyterian Rebellion.” The American War precipitated the French Revolution and general European war. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the idealism of the French Revolution led to impatience at the pace of reform by the Society of United Irishmen. Frustration and resentment at a failure to maintain rising economic and political expectations was compounded by the increasingly heavy taxation demands necessitated by European war. Catholics had been admitted to the franchise in 1793 but the College Green parliament had shown a significant degree of reluctance to ameliorate the general inferior position of catholics. Increasingly the more traditional and “protestant” elements of the parliament were at odds with the reformers and the extra-parliamentary United Irishmen. The United Irishmen had started as a nationalist debating society in 1791 largely in tune with the tradition of Irish constitutional opposition. Increasingly however it took on republican aspects (a logical development given the influence of the radical presbyterian nature of the Belfast branch). In addition certain United Irishmen – Wolfe Tone in particular – developed links with the Defenders, an overtly sectarian secret society. If the republican drift of the United Irishmen was understandable this sectarian development was not. It contradicted the rationalist and enlightened origins of the movement, though it can be explained by United Irish frustration at the reluctance of College Green politicians to dismantle the Penal Laws. Furthermore if a revolution was to come about somebody more than middle class intellectuals were needed; a mass movement was also required. Two of the strands of Irish Nationalism are from here on apparent: republicanism and catholicism; seldom however were they to be easy partners. Mention has already been made of the presbyterian radical if not “democratic” tradition and approval by some of the American and French Revolutions. Celebrations of the fall of the Bastille through demonstrations and by the Belfast Newsletter predated the formation of the United Irishmen and illustrated the liberal if not radical side of presbyterianism. A radical outlook did not mean that most or all presbyterians were republican or revolutionary. Despite their second-class status many were still conscious that they had stood side-by-side with their anglican neighbours against catholic besiegers a hundred years earlier. Apart from a few United Irish survivors few would identify with the excesses of French Revolutionary Jacobinism or the catholic jacquerie of south Leinster by the late summer of 1798. The prayer of the Rev Sinclare Kelburn perhaps best sums up the attitude of the alienated but non-revolutionary presbyterian: “O Lord, if it be possible, have mercy on the King”. Doc 2i Dr William Drennan, an Ulster Presbyterian, wrote enthusiastically of extending the new United Irish Society from Belfast to Dublin: “A society having much of the ceremonial freemasonary, so much secrecy as might communicate curiosity, uncertainty, expectation to the minds of surrounding men, so much impressive and affecting ceremony in its internal economy as without impeding real business might strike the soul through the senses. A benevolent conspiracy - a plot for the people – no whig club – no party title - The Brotherhood its name - the rights of man and the greatest number its end its general and real independence to Ireland and republicanism its particular purpose.” Quoted in NHI iv p294 taken from Drennan letters (ed DA Chart), (Belfast 1931) Frustration with progress at College Green, together with opportunism and idealism fostered by revolution abroad and economic uncertainty raised the political temperature, expectations were also heightened and then dashed by the brief vice-royalty of Earl Fitzwilliam in early 1795. Fitzwilliam attempted to bring about full catholic emancipation and to purge the Dublin administration of placemen and powerbrokers. He was himself dismissed within eight weeks and had shown himself to be politically inept. Undoubtedly he had exceeded his brief, but his rapid repudiation also perhaps indicates a degree of panic by Pitt’s government. Whatever the interpretation, in Roy Foster’s words “the fat was in the fire”; reformers were frustrated and conservatives were frightened. The headlong career of the United Irishmen from evolution toward revolution was matched by tough and provocative measures by the government - in particular by General Lake. As well as regular troops, the Yeomanry (formed in 1796) were widely employed to excess. Such actions had two effects: they succeeded in pre-empting a coordinated United Irish and Defenderist rebellion; but they also provoked insurrection through the draconian nature of the arrests. Fitzwilliam’s attempted reforms and those concessions to catholics made by College Green since 1782 had led to a general collapse in protestant morale; each amelioration of a catholic grievance undermined protestant authority in the localities. (See the reference to protestant insecurity, isolation and vulnerability in the previous chapter). An extreme aspect of this was that some landlords in Armagh (i.e. William Blacker) and elsewhere in Ulster joined the nascent Orange movement partly in response to legislative changes but also due to Defender depredations. At this time defenderism was spreading from the countryside to the artisans of the nearby towns. Doc 2ii Wolfe Tone, an Anglican who had once contemplated a career in the British colonial service, contrasted the differences between the English and Irish: “Animated by their unconquerable hatred of France, which no change of circumstances could alter, the whole English nation, it may be said, retracted from their first decision in favour of the glorious and successful efforts of the French people: they sickened at the prospect of the approaching liberty and happiness of that mighty nation: they calculated, as merchants, the probable effects which the energy of regenerated France might have on their commerce…. But matters are very different in Ireland, an oppressed, insulted, and plundered nation. As we well knew, experimentally, what it is to be enslaved, we sympathized most sincerely with the French people, and watched their progress to freedom with the utmost anxiety; we had not like England, a prejudice rooted in our very nature against France. As the Revolution advanced, and as events expanded themselves, the public spirit of Ireland rose with a rapid acceleration. The fears and animosities of the aristocracy rose in the same, or a still higher proportion. In a little time the French Revolution became the test of every man’s political creed, and the nation was fairly divided into two great parties, the Aristocrats and the Democrats, who have ever since been measuring each other’s strength, and carrying on a kind of smothered war, which the course of events, it is highly probable, may soon call into energy and action.” The ’Ninety-eight rebellion. Tone, probably the most republicanly-minded of the leading United Irishmen, made three attempts at French intervention in Ireland. In December 1796 violent storms dispersed a 36 ship French fleet with 14,500 troops bound for Bantry Bay. Though United Irish morale was heightened by this attempted French intervention, the French themselves were somewhat disillusioned by the lack of local support. Their subsequent landing of 1,100 men under General Humbert at Killala met with initial success, but was too small and too late to affect the course of the piecemeal rebellion of the summer of 1798. The main French invasion force arrived much later in October only to be captured in Lough Swilly (with Wolfe Tone on board) by a British fleet. The authorities were already taking decisive action against the United Irishmen before Houche’s Bantry Bay expedition. By the early summer of 1798 they had arrested most of the Directory of the United Irishmen. An ill-disciplined but effective military, yeomanry and militia had destroyed much of the rebel organisation in Leinster and Ulster, its two strongest areas. Ironically the Houche and later the Humbert expeditions were aimed at the coasts of west Munster and north Connacht, the areas where the United Irishmen were weakest. It seems unlikely that there was any central coordination of the rebellion in the summer of 1798. Three distinct episodes or phases can be identified: In late May and early June a disorganised but initially successful peasant rising took place in south Leinster. The characteristics of this were a fearsome peasant disregard for their own lives and a vicious anti-protestant pogrom quite at odds with the ideals of the United Irishmen’s Directorate. In early June a very short fiasco of an Ulster rebellion took place, General Lake having previously culled and gutted the Ulster movement. Humbert’s invasion in August did put to flight the local garrison before he surrendered less than a fortnight later. There had been little Irish support and the main force of Frenchmen was to arrive belatedly in Lough Swilly. So what had the fiasco of ’98 achieved? It achieved two things: It had frightened the British authorities and Irish protestants (including many presbyterians). It had indicated to the former that the current legislative and administrative system could not continue. It had established a pedigree of myth, based on elements of fact - the republican myth. The cause of republicanism and Irish independence had been established. Its failure was seen as a glorious failure, part of a tradition that was to reappear in 1803, 1848, 1867 and 1916. Rebel bravery was remembered as were the summary executions, floggings, pitch-capping and “half hangings” of the military. The rational and non-sectarian elements of the United Irish movement’s leadership were remembered rather than the fearful massacres at Wexford and Scullabogue. Subsequent generations of protestants would remember and mythologise these atrocities much as nationalist opinion would remember the brutal pre-empting of the rebellion and its harsh repression by crown forces. If the pedigree of armed republicanism and the mutual memory and myth of atrocity were to live on in the long term, the short term consequences of the “Ninety Eight” were the end of the 1782 parliament and the passing of the Act of Union. The end of the Irish parliament Pitt’s government could argue that maladministration in Ireland had provoked and allowed rebellion and enemy intervention at the height of a major war. That war was not only with the traditional enemy, France, but also with the ideological tyranny of revolutionary republicanism. The British administration therefore had very practical reasons for concern and reform, additionally however they now had an excuse to end “Grattan’s Parliament” conceded at a time of weakness in 1782. The pre-1782 Dublin parliament had taken much money and effort to “manage” in the preceding centuries. Clashes between Westminster and Dublin had occurred since 1782, it was in the interest of the privy council in London to rectify this situation. The union of the Scottish and English parliaments had come about in 1707, rationalisation called for the “tidy” centralisation of parliamentary activity at Westminster. It took two years to bring about the end of the Irish parliament, it could not have been achieved unless sufficient Irish parliamentarians were rattled by the “Ninety Eight” and saw protestant self-interest and security best preserved within a United Kingdom. The end of local independence might well be a necessary and worthwhile sacrifice to preserve crown, religion and property. Pitt’s first attempt at union was defeated by 111 votes to 106 in January 1799. There were still an assortment of parliamentary vested interests, ‘patriots’ and those who feared for the protestant cause. All these strongly opposed a union. The placemen could be “bought” in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century tradition. The ‘patriots’ and those aware that Irish commerce in general and the prosperity of Dublin in particular would suffer, could not be bought but some were persuaded. Many ultra protestants (not just the Orange interest, but those like John Foster [the Speaker of the Irish House of Commons]) rightly perceived union to be a Trojan horse by which British concessions to catholics would undermine the protestant ascendancy in Ireland. It would take a generation to win many of the protestant interest to the union but waverers of various motives were won over by the inescapable logic of Lord Chancellor Fitzgibbon’s speech in favour of the union: “…Next, if we become one people with England, the army of the Empire will be employed where it is most wanted for general service; and so long as it is found necessary garrison every district in Ireland, for the internal safety of the country, force may be stationed here, without incurring additional expense in either country…” No longer would protestants be a vulnerable minority in their own country they would be part of a majority in a state where catholics would never be a majority. However Pitt’s sweetener for the catholic majority was to be their emancipation, the “Trojan horse” feared by the protestant interest. He argued that Ireland’s susceptibility to subversion and invasion was in part at least due to catholic alienation and exclusion from the system. Prior to the revolution in France catholicism was a natural ally of the “most catholic King of the French”; now French royalists and the church were allies against the atheism and republicanism of revolutionary France. The French-educated hierarchy of Irish catholicism endorsed this view and looked to London for constructive amelioration. Doc 2iii Undated list of promises of promotion written by Under Secretary Edward Cooke (Castlereagh Papers) Belvidere Pensions and Privy Councillor Northland Representative Peer, son to the Primate for a living Bective Marquis and Representative Peer Oxmantown Representative Peer Roden Representative Peer, and his son to be in Office O’Neill Representative Peer and Earl Altamont Marquis and Ribbon and Representative Peer Bandon Representative Peer and Earl Glandore Representative Peer Donoughmore Representative Peer and Earl Clermont - Carleton Representative Peer and to retire Longford Representative Peer Caledon Earl. Bishopric Erne Representative Peer Kenmare Earl Carysfort British Peer Caher Representative Peer Desart Representative Peer Aylmer Pension Ely British Peer, Marquis, Lord Loftus, son in church Templetown Viscount Clare - Glentworth Representative Peer and Viscount Leitrim Representative Peer and Privy Councillor Callan Representative Peer Lucan Representative Peer Yelverton Viscount and £1,000 a year Londonderry British Peer Longueville Representative Peer. Viscount Lord Conyngham Representative Peer Rossmore Representative Peer Llandaff Representative Peer Tyrawley Son a Peer Molesworth - Monck Viscount Allen - Kilconnell Viscount and Earldom promised and Bishopric for his son Clifden His place for life Tullamore Viscount Gosford An Earl Kilwarden Viscount Wicklow Representative Peer Doc 2iv Letter from the Chief Secretary Castlereagh to the British Home Secretary reporting on the narrowness of Parliamentary support for the Union. Private Dublin Castle 23rd January, 1799 My Lord, Your Grace will be informed by the Lord Lieutenant’s dispatch of the outline and result of yesterday’s proceeding. I am truly sorry it was not more favourable. We certainly had reason to expect an attendance of 150 friends from the interests that went with us, but various causes reduced our strength to 107. Only two of Lord Downshire’s* and three of Lord Ely’s appeared. Several stayed away on whom we had reason to count, and others who had promised their support left us in the course of the debate. Lord de Clifford’s members did not attend. Our discussion lasted 20 hours. The question was discussed boldly and fairly by our friends, but the clamour and management, with the assistance of the Chair, was against us. We rejected the amendment by a single vote. Under circumstances so discouraging, I could not rely on the adherence of our friends. I felt it therefore necessary to guard against a defeat (knowing they meant to proceed immediately to move their amendments) and to intimate to the House that the measure would not be further proceeded in without giving timely notice; that the feelings of Parliament, as disclosed in the debate etc., would meet with all due consideration; but I distinctly stated that it was a measure which Government never would abandon or lose sight of. The language of the opposition was most violent, in general denying the competence of Parliament to entertain the measure, and hinting (in very intelligible terms) resistance. It was met with decision, but the zeal and clamour of our opponants gave them a manifest advantage. We shall tomorrow resist any alteration in the Address, and wait for your Grace’s further instructions. I trust your Grace will approve what has been yielded to from necessity. I have the honour to remain With the highest respect in haste Your Grace’s most faithful servant Castlereagh His Grace The Duke of Portland *Castlereagh was incorrect in believing Downshire was in favour of Union. (See Doc 2vi below) Doc 2v Letter from Cornwallis, the Lord Lieutenant on political jobbery (from the Cornwallis Correspondence, vol iii) Phoenix Park, June 8, 1799 Dear Ross, ….. My occupation is now of the most unpleasant nature, negotiating and jobbing with the most corrupt people under heaven. I despise and hate myself every hour for engaging in such dirty work, and am supported only by the reflection that without an Union the British Empire must be dissolved ……. I am &c. Cornwallis Doc 2vi Anti-Union circular from the Marquis of Downshire, the Earl of Charlemont and William Ponsonby urging the Irish counties to get up petitions to Parliament. Although parliamentary opposition to the Union had declined this circular helped raise extra-parliamentary opposition. Dublin, January 20, 1800 Sir, A number of Gentlemen of both Houses of Parliament, of whom thirty-eight represent Counties, have authorised us to acquaint you, that it is their Opinion, that Petitions to Parliament, declaring the real Sense of the Freeholders of the Kingdom on the Subject of a Legislative Union, would, at this Time, be highly expedient; and if such a Proceeding shall have your Approbation, we are to request you will use your Influence to have such a Petition from your County without Delay. We have the Honor to be, Sir, Your most obedient, humble Servants, Downshire Charlemont WB Ponsonby The Act of Union The Act of Union was no ordinary piece of legislation it was a fundamental law, effectively a constitution. Though the existing enactments of both parliaments remained in force and Dublin Castle’s administration remained, everything else was written and enshrined anew. Once written it became a shibboleth to be preserved at all costs (i.e. unionism); whilst nationalism sought to amend the union to destruction. Inflexible approaches – to an “untidy” and flawed piece of legislation meant that over the subsequent 120 years entrenched defence of the union may well have created a demand for national self-determination that fed on a combination of old and new myths, that had not previously existed outside the circles of the United Irishmen. Eventually Castlereagh (Chief Secretary, who acted as the advocate for the London government’s policy in the College Green parliament) secured a comfortable Commons majority of 158 to 115 for the dissolution of the Irish parliament and the creation of the Union. Naturally much was made by nationalists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the bribery involved in ending the College Green parliament: men were bought and borough owners were compensated, likewise powerful anti unionists like John Foster were sacked. The degree of buying and selling may have been within the then accepted bounds of eighteenth century parliamentary management. The level of political and public debate was high and intense and some were won over by the arguments of those such as Fitzgibbon mentioned above. The main terms of the Act of Union of 1800 were as follows: The Irish parliament was abolished. 28 representative Irish peers and the 4 Anglican archbishops were to sit in the House of Lords. 100 MPs would sit in the House of Commons The established Churches of England and Ireland were united as one. Ireland would, for a period of transition, retain its own Exchequer and be responsible for its own national debt. The system would be regularly reviewed to enable the eventual merging of the two systems. Ireland would contribute 2/17 towards joint UK expenditure. Customs duties on a specified range of manufactured goods would remain for 20 years. Existing tariffs would be adjusted in the interests of fairness. The enactments of both parliaments would remain in force, unless they (or the Act of Union itself) were amended by the United Kingdom parliament. Pitt’s government was never able to bring about catholic emancipation, the combination of British (including Irish) parliamentary opinion together with the hostility of George III meant that the issue was quietly dropped. This may have satisfied those of the protestant interest but it created or confirmed Irish catholic opinion’s belief in the fundamental cynicism and insincerity of the British. Catholics though excluded from membership of “Grattan’s Parliament” began to look on that assembly at College Green as more than a protestant parliament – as a Patriot Parliament that had spoken for Ireland. Thus the myth of a golden age of 18 years, between 1782 and 1800 was born. “Grattan’s Parliament” had been “stolen” by Perfidious Albion, who then cynically reneged on the promise of catholic emancipation. It should not be forgotton that the catholic hierarchy broadly accepted the Union with its promise of emancipation. The catholic church had been hostile to the ’98 Rebellion and many catholics served in the regular forces and the militia. Britain or more commonly “England” could add the “Union” and catholic emancipation to the broken promises of the Treaty of Limerick (1691). The catholic lawyer Daniel O’Connell had from the outset opposed the Union (obviously from outside parliament); over the next generation and a half he was to mould Irish nationalism around the twin pillars of catholic emancipation and the Repeal of the Act of Union. After the turmoil of the ’90s and the political furore of the Union debate the early years of the nineteenth century were quiet excepting the momentary fiasco of Robert Emmet’s Dublin rebellion of 1803 (this being the last physical spasm of the United Irishmen). Life went on for most as before – producing and earning a living under wartime conditions. The College Green parliament had affected the propertied classes, the law and the churches but (as with Great Britain) had not affected on a day-to-day basis the bulk of the non-political and unpropertied nation. Gradually, however, Dublin became a ghost of its former self: it was now no longer a capital city merely a provincial one. Physically and socially Dublin therefore suffered a malaise, part of which may well have happened due to the relative stagnation of the Irish economy in the nineteenth century, which was largely due to factors unconnected with the Act of Union. Ireland with a population roughly equating to half of that of Great Britain retained its administration – Dublin Castle – despite legislative union. The Irish ascendancy retained its monopoly of internal Irish patronage and its control of the administration; the vice regal court in what was now a mere provincial city continued but became an increasing absurdity and anachronism. The retention of anglican ascendancy at the Castle was inevitable given the size and scope of Irish administration and with the absence of catholic emancipation it was inevitable that landed members of the established church should continue as office holders. It would be truly absurd to imagine that in an age when land and patronage were the keys to power that the anglican ascendancy would not continue to exercise power and influence. With catholic emancipation in 1829, the development of a Victorian meritocracy and the attitudes of men such as Robert Peel, John Burgoyne and Thomas Drummond the Castle would change – slowly. Characteristics of the Union It was natural that there would be a nationalist critique of the ‘Castle’ – it symbolised the Union interest and by class, religion and politics nationalists were outsiders. They were sometimes jealous of the perks of office and influence but at other times hostile to the very concept of an administration staffed by their political enemies. The Union however was flawed even if one leaves aside the nationalist critique. The act promulgated union yet Ireland was ruled differently to Great Britain: special legislation frequently treated the country separately (because it was different) and yet on other occasions quite inappropriate pieces of legislation such as the 1838 Irish Poor Law (largely mirroring the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act) were imposed. Ireland was sometimes treated differently and sometimes inflexibly the same. British assumptions failed to allow for a multitude of differences: Ireland was theoretically treated as an integral part of the United Kingdom, but given the attention of a colony. As only 1 in 6 MPs represented Irish constituencies it was seldom in 120 years of dynamic change and reform that Ireland received consistent intelligent attention that would allow for marked social, economic and religious differences, let alone different sets of cultural norms. Ireland did receive intelligent government as well as coercive security measures but the former like the latter was a species of crisis management implemented whenever Irish affairs boiled over to obtrude into British parliamentary and administrative life. Ireland was at times a social laboratory where imaginative and sometimes progressive departures from laissez faire were made, which the government of the day would never have dreamed of enacting for Great Britain itself. The degree to which nineteenth century history followed a prima facie nationalist agenda is a debatable theme: the fate of the Union was a direct issue for under half of the nineteenth century (though the primary issue in the twenty relevant years of the twentieth century); for much of the nineteenth century (including those decades devoted to Repeal or Home Rule) religion and land were the major issues on the political agenda. The Union had been based on these twin pillars and at each stage they had been proclaimed to be permanent and invioble. Their attrition undermined the Union throughout because of the inflexible guarantees and apparent safeguards that had been written into the union and subsequently endorsed by generations of government ministers. To argue that the Union relationship between Britain (England?) and Ireland was inflexible as well as being unsatisfactory is not strictly true. Governments claimed the Union was unalterable but in practice it was constantly evolving. As Oliver MacDonagh has pointed out (Ireland, The Union and its aftermath) the Ireland of 1914 was largely shaped by Britain, similarly Britain was changed substantially by the precedent of the Irish social laboratory and by migration. Moreover British parliamentary life was changed utterly by the most dynamic political force of the late nineteenth century, Parnell and his parliamentary party. Governments before 1880 had been altered by their Irish experience and they had taken on board part at least of what O’Connell in particular had advocated; but in the world of the 1880s and beyond the “Irish” nationalists (and unionists) set the agenda for British politics and almost ruled despite the union arithmetic that the Irish MP only made up a sixth of the House of Commons. Perhaps two closely placed islands could not be anything other than Siamese twins with or without an Act of Union, whether perfect or flawed. The Administration – an overview Irish local government lacked the manpower and money to develop a voluntary system of control and administration that was one of the most stabilising elements of the British political system. In England for centuries most of the duties of justice and local government had devolved on a numerous and conscientious gentry that was a homogeneous part of general society. In Ireland the thinly spread, sometimes absent and often alien country gentry could not undertake the multitudinous roles of administration practised and extended in nineteenth century Britain. From an early stage such functions were professionalised and nationalised, the burden falling on the taxpayer rather than on the insubstantial ratepayer. Unarmed, county police forces grew up from 1829 onwards in Britain. The relatively lawless nature of Ireland (traditional secret societies, faction fighting and land hunger) meant that a stronger and different police force developed in Ireland earlier than in Britain. It was nationally trained, directed and recruited; it was a gendarmerie rather than a local and civilian force. Its origins lay with Robert Peel’s Peace Preservation Force of 1814 and the Constabulary of 1822 that were to merge as the Irish Constabulary (largely catholic - later Royal) in 1836, becoming nationally controlled. Its expertise and experience were to make it the blueprint for (significantly) British colonial policing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that like the Irish Constabulary were to develop a multitude of administrative duties carried out by local government in Britain. Only in Dublin did a Metropolitan Police develop and survive on the British model (1836). Parallel with policing was the establishment of a resident magistracy (RMs), partly to fill the vacuum created by an insufficiently homogonous and numerous gentry to act as JPs and partly to compensate for the potential political bias and perceived venality of the landowning classes. To have widened the scope of Irish local administration would have admitted catholics to power and influence thus introducing greater polarisation than the nationalising of administrative and judicial functions. Whatever its efficiency (and degree of inadequacy) the administration’s very institution and imposition in an increasingly democratic century made it susceptible to nationalist criticism. In the field of public health and social welfare the provisions of the Irish model largely predated those of Britain. By-and-large the Irish model was superior; only in relation to the Poor Law did the system fail, largely because when the inadequate English system was imposed it was quite unsuited for both Ireland’s economy and demography. Though the quality differed widely from place to place: 600-odd public dispensaries providing free medicine and care were set up between 1805 and 1840. When compared with Britain (and elsewhere) this was quite revolutionary and very progressive. Similarly a network of locally financed county infirmaries and fever hospitals received government grants. Mental provision was provided by regional hospitals and national inspection, this was in marked contrast to the heterogeneous and ad hoc nature of nineteenth century British provision. From 1817 onwards central government loans were available not only for public works projects but for ventures that were largely commercial. The absence of a sufficiently sophisticated economic and organic infrastructure (and for that matter a sufficiently large and public spirited voluntary sector – which Peel saw as the main cause of Ireland’s problems) meant that very modern if not “socialistic” expedients were to be found. Actions by the Board of Works (1831) and the Ordnance Survey (from 1825) went far beyond the laissez faire and limited roles of similar bodies in Great Britain. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the establishment of the Congested Districts Board made provision for industry, fisheries and agricultural investment. This used taxpayer’s money and the disendowed funds of the Church of Ireland in the poor western counties. The provision of a national Board of Education (1831) provided syllabuses, teacher training, an inspectorate and schools two years before the first English education grant and some 39 years before the first provision of State education in England and Wales. Such progressive provision was a largely negative response to the revolutionary and anarchic risk of illiteracy and lack of instruction that might develop in a vacuum. Moreover – horror of horrors – this vacuum might be filled by the superstitious and potentially seditious catholic church! In much the same vein Peel’s Queen’s Colleges of 1845 were to provide secular university education. From an early stage the university initiative ran into political and religious controversy that was to be a major issue in Irish and Westminster politics through to the early years of the twentieth century. These expedients were largely in response to vacuums in the Irish economy and due to a lack of suitable (objective) manpower. Whether born of need, want or fear they certainly provided Ireland with a largely centralised and uniform degree of inspection and professionalism, giving it a relatively well-planned and adequate infrastructure. Mention has been made previously of the relative stagnation of the nineteenth century Irish economy. Nationalism tended to stress the cynical and exploitative nature of the Union and that when Irish tariffs were removed in 1821 the Irish economy fell prey to British depredations. This is too simplistic an explanation and does not take into account that willy-nilly Ireland was geographically too close to the economic giant that dominated Europe (if not the world) for much of the nineteenth century. Britain’s abundant supply of coal, iron and its long maritime and commercial tradition made it inevitable that Ireland would be eclipsed in industrial and commercial terms. Reasonable provision had been made in 1800. Though the two exchequers were united in 1817 Ireland enjoyed lower rates of taxation until the 1850s. Despite the eighteenth century industrial revolution no British (or Irish) politician could have foretold the magnitude of Britain’s economic advance any more than observers could have foretold that Britain would totally eclipse the great enemy France in the nineteenth century both in terms of population and industry. This preferential treatment was ended by Gladstone’s budgets of 1853-5 and Disraeli’s of 1858. The initial relative generosity of the Union settlement was therefore wiped out by the insensitive adoption of fiscal uniformity at a time when the economic differentials between the two islands increased. Such moves though logical in terms of political union, indicated Gladstone’s doctrinaire (though optimistic) approach to financial affairs. Disraeli merely completed the process that his rival had created. During many phases of the nineteenth century Britain would suffer a decline and dislocation in particular industries leading to unemployment and social unrest; the dynamism of its economy generally found new openings. Britain in this sense was unique, only eastern Ulster was able to consolidate its position by developing its traditional linen industry as its cotton industry declined. In contrast the Irish woollen industry was unable to survive or adjust. Though reference will be made below to ad hoc intervention in the Irish economy and social administration by central government it was beyond the means or brief of any (nineteenth century) government to intervene on a more massive scale. Surely the proof of this is that despite the protectionist and to a degree interventionist policies of Irish governments since independence Ireland remained poor, its chief export (and money earner) being manpower. Only with the new economy of the last twenty years and the massive impact of the EU has Ireland become a net economic and employment gainer. |